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Judicial Review of SEC Rule 14a-8:
No Action Decisions
Andrew A. Markus*
A RECENT DECISION of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia' has focused attention on the dissident
stockholders' right to have the courts review the Securities and
Exchange Commission's informal acquiescence to management's re-
fusal to include in its proxy statement a proposal of the dissidents.
The controversy centers around proxy regulation 14a-82 promulgated
pursuant to section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 3
Proposals of Security Holders
The primary purpose of section 14 is the protection of investors
through the regulation of proxy statements. 4 Since it is virtually
impossible for all investors to be present at annual meetings to vote
their individual shares, the law permits the solicitation of proxies
for that purpose. But without effective regulation of such solicitation,
the door would be opened to the perpetuation of power by those
already holding it-a policy wholly inconsistent with corporate
democracy. 14a-8 is designed to further the goal of protecting in-
vestors by guaranteeing that any security holder who is entitled to
a vote may have a proposal of his own included in management's
proxy solicitation;5 and if management opposes the proposal, the
security holder is also guaranteed a statement of his own, up to 100
words, in favor of the proposal. 6 The proxy statements are mailed
to all shareholders who then have the opportunity to either approve
or disapprove the proposal.
However, certain circumstances do exist when management may
omit a proposal from its proxy statement. Such circumstances occur
when the proposal is determined not to be a proper subject for action
by security holders;7 when the purpose of the proposal is to promote
political, religious, social, or personal causes;8 when the proponent
*B.A., University of Pittsburgh; Third-year student, Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law.
1 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), vacated as moot, remanded to Ct. App. for dismissal
U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971).
3 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (1971).
4 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cer. granted, 4-01 U.S. 973 (1971), vacated as moot, remanded to Ct. App. for dis-
missal,--U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1971).
. Id. at § 240.14a-B(b).
7 Id. at § 240.14a-8(c)(1). What is a proper subject for stockholder action is to be
determined by state law, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 84-7 (1948).
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1971).
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of the proposal has either failed to come forward and present it, or
it has previously failed on its own merits;9 or when the proposal
relates to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issu-
ing corporation. 10
The burden of proving any of these circumstances rests upon
management who must submit to the Commission its reasons for ex-
clusion along with opinion of counsel if the reasons are based on
matters of law." However, in practice this burden is often not met
nor is it insisted upon by the Commission with the result that the
shareholders may not be able to determine the precise reasons why
their proposal was excluded.12
Because time is of the essence in a proxy contest, the Commis-
sion procedures must of necessity be informal. The rules require that
all proxy material, including reasons for exclusion of any sharehold-
er's proposals, must be submitted to the Commission so that it may
determine if all the rules are being complied with.1 A member of
the Division of Corporation Finance examines the material and then
writes an informal letter to the parties suggesting any corrections
that will make the statement better comply with the rules. This
letter is not an administrative order in the strict sense of the word
and refusal to comply with it is not per se a violation of the proxy
rules; but again because time is of the essence, the suggestions in the
letter are usually followed. 14
The problem arises when management refuses to include in its
proxy statement a shareholder's proposal, and the Commission issues
a letter stating that it will take no action with regard to manage-
ment's position. The general inference to be drawn from such inaction
is that the Commission agrees with the reason management has given
for exclusion,' 5 although section 26 of the Act indicates the con-
trary. 16 There is little the shareholder can do but acquiesce, as any
attempt to have the Commission change its mind would in all liklihood
be fruitless. But in the interest of preserving the informal nature
of its advisory letters, such action by the Commission is usually
9 Id. at § 240.14a-8(c) (3) (4).
10 Id. at § 240.14a-8 (c) (5).
11 Id. at § 240.14a-8(d).
12 See Note, The SEC and "No Action" Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8: The Case
for Direct Judicial Re'view, 84 HARV. L. REV. 835, 842-44 (1971).
IS 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1971).
14 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORM, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, 138-46 (2d
cd.. (1968).
15 See Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
16 "No action or failure to act by the Commission . . . in the administration of this
chapter shall be construed to mean that the particular authority has in any way
passed upon the merits of, or given approval to any security or any transaction or
transactions therein, nor shall such action or failure to act with regard to any state-
ment or report filed with or examined by such authority pursuant to this chapter
6r rules and regulations thereunder, be deemed a finding by such authority that such
statement or report is true and accurate on its face or that it is not false or mislead-
ing." 48 Stat. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78z (1971).
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (2) May 1972210
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justified. Since the shareholder can get no relief from the Commis-
sion, the question then is can he go to the courts for such relief?
The Law Prior to Medical Committee
Section 25(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act provides that
any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission may have that
order reviewed in the Court of Appeals.17 Because the "no action"
letter is not a formal order of the Commission, it has been historically
held that the courts do not have jurisdiction to review within the
meaning of section 25(a).18 The shareholder has therefore been in
the position of having the Commission's "no action" letter take on
every aspect of a final order as to him and yet not having it recog-
nized. as such by the courts.
The most the shareholder could hope to have examined is simply
whether the Commission had abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a hearing on the matter.19 But because the Commission is in
a better position to evaluate all the evidence and can benefit from its
vast experience in such matters, the courts are inclined to give great
deference to such "no action" letters even though they are in no
way formal orders.2 0 These letters take the effect of an inferpretation
by the Commission that the proxy rules have not been violated; and
unless this interpretation is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation, it becomes of controlling weight.21 Although instances
have occurred when the courts have substituted their own interpreta-
tion of the proxy rules for that of the Commission,2 2 the great defer-
ence given by the courts to the Commission's interpretation of the
proxy rules is best exemplified by the case of Peck v. Greyhound Corp.23
In this case, a security holder in the defendant corporation sought
to have included in the proxy statement a proposal for abolishing
segregated seating on buses in the South. The defendant corporation
refused to include it under rule 14a-8 as not being a proper subject
for action by stockholders. The Division of Corporation Finance
17 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78y(a) (1971).
Is Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. SEC, 85 F.Zd 914 (2d Cir. 1936); Guaranty Underwriters,
Inc. v. SEC, 131 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1942) ; but cf. Comment: Medical Committee For
Human Rights v. SEC: Judicial Re'view of SEC No-Action Determinations Under the
Proxy Rules, 57 VA. L. Rav. 331 at 343 (1971), "Section 25(a) does not specifically
preclude judicial review of nonorders but merely assures review of actual orders."
19 Dyer v. SEC, 290 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1961) ; see also Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). Both cases found no abuse of
discretion, and Leighton, in fact, declared that even if the Commission's refusal to
investigate the shareholder's complaint constituted an order, it would be one within
his discretion and not reviewable. Leighton v. SEC, supra at 91.
20 Doyle v. Milton, 73 F.Supp. 281, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Peck v. Greyhound Corp.,
'97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Weeks v. Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass.
1955); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
21 Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
22 SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956);
see also E. ARANOW & E. ENHORK, snpra note 14, at 467-70.
21 Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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agreed, and the Commission took no action. In an unsuccessful action
by plaintiff shareholder to enjoin solicitation, the court said:
Rules and regulations adopted by administrative agencies
pursuant to Congressional authorization are best interpreted,
in the first instance, by the agency which has been entrusted
with the power and authority to write them.24
The Commission by statute has the power to both enjoin a
threatened violation of the proxy rules in the district courts 2 5 or
to seek a writ of mandamus to compel persons to comply with the
rules. 26 But when the Commission has failed to do so, or when the
courts because of the great deference given to the Commission's in-
terpretation of the proxy rules have found no abuse of discretion,
or when they simply have declared that the "no action" letter is not
subject to review, there is only one avenue of relief opened to the
shareholder.
The Private Action
Private action is not sanctioned by the Act, but the private in-
vestor's right to sue for enforcement of the proxy rules has long been
recognized in most jurisdictions.27 If the shareholder has been injured
by defendant's violation of the proxy rules, it has also been held
that ". . . he does not have to wait for the SEC to bring the action
for him."28 The shareholder need not have been directly injured, for
a right of action is available even if he is a member of a class of
shareholders who have been injured.29
In 1964, the Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Boraks° recognized
for the first time the private right of action not only for direct
causes but for derivative causes as well. The Court felt that the
private action was a necessary supplement to agency action.8 1 It fur-
ther stated that the remedies available need not be limited to declar-
atory or prospective relief, for the federal courts are fully capable
of providing any remedy to carry out the congressional purpose of
protecting investors.9 2
Due process of law requires that the individual shareholder be
given a private right of action also. This is so because the share-
holder is at a disadvantage at the outset. If the Commission advises
management that its proxy materials do not comply with the rules,
management may secure a judicial test of this determination by sim-
24 Id. at 681.
2 48 Stat. 899, 900 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(e) (1971).
26 48 Stat. 899, 900 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(f) (1971).
27 Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948); see also E. ARANow & E. EINHORN,
supra note 14, at 463-80.
28 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1961).
29 Id.
30 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
81 Id. at 432.
82 Id. at 434-35.
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ply disregarding the Commission's advice and defending against an
injunction action. But when no further administrative procedure is
left for the shareholder, there is no way he can have a judicial deter-
mination of whether or not there has been a violation of the rules
by management unless the private action is available. 33
However, in the final analysis, the private right of action is not
the answer either. The need for judicial review is essential not merely
for the protection of individual rights but also for the protection of
the public as a whole, for "as long as only private actions may be
brought following administrative action, the agency process will
remain insulated from needed judicial scrutiny and supervision."3 4
Right of Review
Before a shareholder who has become the victim of a "no action"
letter can even hope to get judicial review of his problem, he must
show that he has overcome ". . . the long-settled rule of judicial ad-
ministration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed
or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted."35 This is a necessary rule of law that cannot be
denied. Administrative agencies are created to fulfill a certain need
in society, a need to control certain aspects of society that are either
too big or too complex for Congress or the courts to do an effective
job of controlling. Agencies are specialized branches of the govern-
ment which relieve the Congress and the courts of this onus. Were
it not for the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
agencys' entire purpose would be thwarted, for aggrieved parties
would be seeking the aid of the courts for every agency ruling that
did not agree with them. The effect on the administration of justice
would be catastrophic.
But what administrative remedy is left to the shareholder in this
situation? Though the Commission has not issued what may be termed
a final order, yet its action has every effect of being one for the
shareholder. The shareholder cannot get relief from the Commission,
for the Commission has refused to grant even a review and has ad-
herred to its position that no action for violation of the proxy rules
is in order. The only recourse is an expensive private action which
many shareholders cannot afford, so that in the end they have no
relief at all.
But the fact that only final orders are said to be reviewable
should not deter the shareholder. As the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia said in Isbrandsten Co. v. U.S. :36
33 Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARM. L. REV. 1041, 104 (1960).
34 Note The SEC and "No Action" Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8: The Case for
Direct Judicial Review, sutra note 12, at 856.
11 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
36 Isbrandtsen Co. v. U.S., 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954) ; see also Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Independent
(Continued on next page)
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Whether or not the statutory requirements of finality
are satisfied in any given case depends not upon the label
affixed to its action by the administrative agency but rather
upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action.
The court in this case did, in fact, review a nonfinal order and grant
the plaintiff injunctive relief against the Federal Maritime Board's
unfavorable action.
It has also become a settled rule of administrative law that "there
is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of adminis-
trative absolutism, unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme."3 7 Indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas said in Barlow
v. Collins :3
[JIudicial review of such administrative action is the
rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be dem-
onstrated . . . The right of judicial review is ordinarily in-
ferred where congressional intent to protect the interests of
the class of which plaintiff is a member can be found .. .
unless members of the protected class may have judicial
review the statutory objectives might not be realized.
Since the purpose of Congress on enacting section 14 of the Securities
and Exchange Act is the protection of investors, 39 the regulations
promulgated thereunder are no less expressive of that intent. This
being the case, unless judicial review is granted, the intent of Con-
gress will be defeated since also the shareholder is a member of the
class Congress was seeking to protect.
Judicial review should be available to the shareholder on still
another ground. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
provides:'
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.40
And agency action as defined by section 51 (13) "includes the whole or
a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equiv-
alent or denial thereof, or failure to act."41
(Continued from preceding page)
Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n. .v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 at 139, (D.C. Cir. 1971) which
stated: "The fact that an agency has not issued a command does not mean that the
step by which it initiated a procedure, or informal activity, leading up to the exercise
of its powers may be relegated to the area of mere unreviewable suggestion."
37 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157
(1970); see also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 at 140 (1967),
"...[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be
cut off unless there is persuasive- reason to -believe that such was. the purpose of
Congress."
8 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970).
9 See supra note 4.
40 go Stat. 392 (1966), 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1966).
41 80 Stat. 381 (1966), 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(13) (1966).
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (2) May 1972214
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That the shareholder is adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action here cannot be denied. The agency has denied him the
qualified right to have his proposal included in the proxy material
without anything but the vaguest notion as to why. Further, the
"no action" letter qualifies as agency action within the definition,
for it is a failure to act. It would be a specious argument to say that
the Commission has acted by saying it will not act.
The shareholder in seeking review does not want the court to
review the merits of his proposal, this he prefers to leave to the
other shareholders. He seeks instead ". . . merely to have the cause
remanded so that the Commission, in accord with proper standards,
can make an enlightened determination of whether enforcement
action would be appropriate." 42 A letter from the Commission to the
effect that it concurs with management action is hardly an enlighten-
ing determination that enforcement of the proxy rules is not in order.
On remand, the Commission would be forced to take the evidence
of both sides and make findings of fact, and its determination could
ultimately turn out the same. This might be viewed as an added un-
necessary burden to be placing on an already overburdened agency,
but when the rights of shareholders are at issue the interest in more
efficient agency administration should yield)4  Besides, with full
disclosure of the facts, it might just as well be determined that the
proxy rules were violated.
Medical Connittee
In 1970, in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,44 judicial
review of a "no action" letter was finally granted. In this case, the
shareholder, Medical Committee for Human Rights, was the owner
of several shares of Dow Chemical stock. It had requested that Dow
include in its 1968 proxy statement a proposal of the Medical Com-
mittee that Dow no longer sell napalm. Dow refused to include the
proposal, and the Commission notified Medical Committee that it
would take no action with regard to Dow's positiOn.45 Though no
grounds were given for the Commission's refusal to review Dow's
position,46 it was Dow's contention that exclusion was justified under
rules 14a-8(c) (2) and 14a-8(c) (5) since it felt that the proposal was
motivated by political reasons and was a matter relating to the
ordinary business operations of the company.4 7 Such a contention
42 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), vacated as moot, remanded to Ct. App. for dis-
missal,-U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
48 But cf. Comment, Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC: Judicial Review 6f
SEC No-Aetion Determinations Under the Proxy Rules, supra note 18, at 339, 34-2.
44 Medical Committ for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), vacated as moot, remanded to Ct. App. for dismissal,
-U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
43 Id. at 661-63.
46 Id. at 676.
47 ld. at 679.
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might have held up under a finding of fact, but none was forthcom-
ing from the Commission. On a petition to review this action of the
Commssion, the court remanded to the Commission ". . . so that it
may reconsider petitioners claim within the proper limits of its dis-
cretionary authority.., and so that the basis for its discretion may
appear clearly on the record, not in conclusory terms but in sufficient
detail to permit prompt and effective review." 48
The court relied on two factors to determine whether or not the
"no action" letter was reviewable. These were whether or not the
administrative action operated with final effect, and whether or
not there was some sort of formal proceeding. 49 Its conclusion was
that the elaborate procedures established by the Commission to carry
out the purpose of the Act possessed ". . . sufficient attributes of
finality and formality to warrant judicial review."50 It did not feel
that any significance attached to the fact that the Commission's
determination was couched in terms of a "no action" decision rather
than in the form of a decree binding the parties to do or refrain from
doing a particular act, since the absence of a formal evidentiary hear-
ing would not compel the conclusion that the Commission's decision
was unreviewable. 51
As to Dow's contention that the proposal was a matter relating
to the ordinary business of the company and therefore properly
excluded, the court held that state law controlled as to what matters
are ordinary business operations and that here the applicable state
law would permit such a proposal.52 Finally, as to Dow's contention
that the proposal was motivated by political reasons, the court said:
No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings
which leads to the conclusion that management may properly
place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to pre-
sent to their co-owners, in accord with applicable state law,
the question of whether they wish to have their assets used
in a manner which they believe to be more socially respon-
sible but possibly less profitable than that which is dictated
by present company policy.58
Conclusion
With increased concern by stockholders about social issues, pro-
posals such as Medical Committee's will undoubtedly become more
commonplace.54 When this happens, there will also be a need for
49 Id. at 682.
48 Id. at 666-67.
50 Id. at 671.
11 Id. at 668.
2 Id. at 680.
53 Id. at 681.
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 14, 1971, at 63, col. 8. Campaign General Motors run by
the Project on Corporate Responsibility, a group backed by Ralph Nader, has success-
fully gotten GM to distribute a 49 page book to its 1.3 million stockholders disclosing
policies on auto safety, pollution control, and minority hiring.
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closer judicial scrutiny of agency actions so that valid, meritorious
proposals will not be lost to "no action" letters.
The Supreme Court granted the SEC certiorari in Medical Commit-
tee55 but before the case could be decided, Dow agreed to include the
proposal in its 1971 statement. 56 The proposal received support from
less than 31% of all voting shareholders 57 which means that pursuant
to the rules it need not be included again by Dow until three years
have passed.5 8 The Court felt that because of the meager support
received by the proposal, it probably would not again be excluded
by Dow in the interest of saving litigation if the Medical Committee
again submitted the proposal.59 This being so, the Court held that
the case was moot.6 0 It vacated the Court of Appeals judgment and
remanded for the purpose of dismissal.6 1
Mr. Justice Douglas voiced a strong dissent to the Court's hold-
ing in which he felt that the controversy was not moot merely be-
cause the Court assumed Dow would no longer oppose the proposal.6 2
He further stated:
The philosophy of our times, I think, requires that such
enterprises be held to a higher standard than that of the
morals of the marketplace which exalts a single-minded,
myopic determination to maximize profits as the traditional
be-all and end-all of corporate concern. The public interest
in having the legality of the practices settled, militates
against a mootness conclusion. 6
Judicial review of the "no action" letter thus is yet to receive
approval by the Supreme Court. Review should, however, be granted,
for any shareholder should be entitled to know the reason for ex-
clusion of his proposal regardless of its merits. Unless this is so,
the purpose of the proxy rules in protecting shareholders will be
defeated.
As a noted authority on securities regulations has said:
The widespread distribution of corporate securities, with
the concomitant separation of ownership and management,
puts the entire concept of the stockholders' meeting at the
mercy of the proxy instrument. This makes the corporate
proxy a tremendous force for good or evil in our economic
scheme. Unregulated, it is an open invitation to self-perpetu-
ation and irresponsibility of management. Properly circum-
scribed, it may well turn out to be the salvation of the modern
corporate system.64
-5 SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 401 U.S. 973 (1971).
50 SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights,-U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 577, 579 (1972).
57 Id.
58 17 C.F.R. § 24-0.14a-8(c) (4) (i) (1971).
59 SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights,-U.S.---, 92 S. Ct. 577, 579 (1972).
0 Id.
6I Id. at 580.
62 id.
63 Id. at 581.
64 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 857-58 (1961).
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